Mencius (Meng K'o, Meng-tzu, 390-305 B.C.). An excerpt from an history of mid-Zhou Chinese thought by Professor Chi-yun Chun, Professor Emeritus of Chinese History at the University of California, Santa Barbara.
For almost one hundred years, the teaching of Confucius suffered distortion by both his followers and his critics. They interpreted the vague and unsystematic words of Confucius to suit their different purposes. It was Mencius who first offered some important clarification and constructive interpretation of the Confucian doctrine. Meanwhile, things had greatly changed. The new class position of the scholars and thinkers became more honorable and there were more rival scholars and thinkers competing for high honors. Travelling from state to state, Mencius was surrounded by a large group of disciples, he was treated with high honor by the rulers of the various states, but he also had to argue more forcefully with his opponents.
By that time, the extremist doctrines of the Mohist and the Ultra-individualist probably attracted more attention than the common sense teaching of Confucius. By Mencius own words,
"The words of Yang Chu and Mo Ti fill the country. In people's conversations, if they do not follow teaching, then they follow Mo's." (Legge, II, 282) According to Mencius, if one cares only for himself, he has no sense of the superior (the political order); if one loves every one else like he loves his father, he has no peculiar feeling for his father (kin relations); but every common person has some sense of a superior and some peculiar feeling for his father. The extremist teachings of Yang Chu and Mo Ti were therefore inhuman. Only the birds and beasts have no concept of a superior or a father, Yang Chu and Mo Ti try to make people like the birds and the beasts. (282) This is highly rhetorical, but it came from Mencius' well-reasoned position. Mencius correctly pointed out the middle position of Confucius' idea of common sense men between the two extremes (464-465).
Confucius had emphasized the importance of men, but had not defined human nature; nor had he defined the ideal society and state. He had the confidence in men who would find the ideal society and state. This confidence was eroded by the continued disorder and suffering after Confucius died. The idea occurred that there might be something wrong in the very nature of men. Mo Ti pointed out a basic contradiction in men's potential or inclination, i.e. men's capacity to love or to harm others. Within the Confucian circle, there was the opinion that human nature is neither good nor bad, but it is morally indeterminate.
One argument was that human nature is like a willow tree and human nature is like the products of wood; to call human nature morally good is to confuse the tree with the wooden products. Against this, Mencius argued that you cannot make the wooden products contrary to their qualities, just as you cannot make moral goodness contrary to human nature; if human nature is amoral, you cannot make it moral. Another argument was: human nature is like flowing water; you open up a passage for it to flow to the east and it will flow to the east; human nature is not inclined to be good or bad, just as water is not inclined toward the east or the west. Against this, Mencius argued that water is inclined to flow downward; although by some external force you can make flow upward, but this is against the nature of water; similarly, human nature is inclined to be good; even though there are some external influences which make men do evil things, this is against man's innate nature.
But what is man's innate nature? It is commonly agreed that this is what is born in man. One argument was: What is born in man is the physical life, the amoral biological instincts. Against this, Mencius raised the basic question concerning the "universal" verses the " particular". He asked; Is there a unique and universal "whiteness" in what is called "white"? In other words, is the "whiteness" in the white feather the same as the "whiteness" in the white snow or in the white jade? If it is, then the nature of a dog is the same as the nature of a cow and the same as the nature of man. If it is not, then the nature of man is not just the universal biological life but something particular in the human being. (pp. 394-397).
Mencius saw morality as what is particular in man, and what makes human beings beings different from mere animals. But how can it be certain that morality is innate in man just as the animal instincts are innate in the animals, and is not something external or artificial, such as an accidental product of society or the environment? Here Mencius made his observation on the "non-societal and non-environmental" human psychology.
"When I say that all men have a mind which cannot bear to see the sufferings of others, my meaning may be illustrated thus: now, if men suddenly see a child about to fall into a well, they will without exception experience a feeling of alarm and distress. They feel so, not as a ground on which they may gain the favor of the child's parents, nor as a ground on which they may seek the praise of their neighbors and friends, nor from a dislike of the reputation for having been unmoved by such a thing. ( All such considerations may come later to the cunning mind, but they come later. What came in the unreflective suddenness was just a feeling of alarm and distress, uncomplicated by artificiality).
From this, Mencius opined that "the feeling of commiseration", "the feeling of shame and dislike", "the feeling of modesty and complaisance" and "the feeling of approving and disapproving" are essential to all men, all common moral human beings. (pp.202-203).
Great morality is built upon these simple common feelings of the ordinary human being, because:
" The feeling of commiseration is the beginning of benevolence. The feeling of shame and dislike is the beginning of righteousness and justice. The feeling of modesty and complaisance is the the beginning of propriety. And the feeling of approving and disapproving is the beginning of knowledge and wisdom". (p.203 & 402).
What is needed is to expand these innate feelings in the ordinary man. For instance, a ruler, being an ordinary man, having a feeling of commiseration will practice commiserating politics. Once Mencius urged King Hsüan of Ch'i to be a commiserating ruler. The heart of King Hsüan had been moved by the suffering of an ox about to be butchered. And Mencius said: "If you could not bear to see the suffering of an ox, how can you bear to see the suffering of your people; if you really reflect on this, you will become a benevolent king".
Mencius postulated a moral essence permeating the cosmos (hao-jan Chih-ch'i) (p.189-190) Every human being was endowed with a moral nature by the cosmos. By expanding one's moral nature, one came into contact with the cosmic essence. It enabled man to unite with other men and finally to be in union with the cosmic Heaven. Heaven endowed in man the original moral feelings. "By fully expanding such moral feelings, one knows his nature; knowing his nature, one knows Heaven. By preserving such moral feelings and nourishing one's nature, man is serving Heaven". (pp.448-449).
Of course Mencius did not take the matter so simply. He knew that men can do many evils. Good and evil constituted a contradiction which gave man a choice (p. 411). Man must continuously make difficult decisions between these two throughout life, and moral greatness is the result of great struggle and suffering:
"Thus, when Heaven is about to confer a great responsibility to a man, it first exercises his mind with suffering, and exerts his sinews and bones with toil. It exposes his body to hunger and subjects him to extreme deprivation. It confounds his deprivations. By all these, it stimulates his mind, hardens his nature, and supplies his incompetences.
"Men for the most part err, and are afterward able to reform. They are distressed in mind and perplexed in their thought, and then they arise to vigorous reformation."
The same difficult struggle also existed for the great nations:
"If a state had no harsh regulations nor strong-willed remonstrators inside and no strong state nor foreign threats outside, it perished. From these, we see how life springs from sorrow and calamity, and death from ease and pleasure." (p.447)
The conflict between men's moral nature and outside influences entails the conflict in the value-judgement of what is right (just, proper), and what is profitable (beneficial, utilitarian). In the very first chapter of the work of Mencius, there is a rigorous denunciation of the profit motivation. According to Mencius, confused knowledge what is right with what is profitable. What is just, proper and right (i) may be universalized and made common agreement among different individuals and groups, thus uniting them in the moral universe. The external conditions, however, differed. What is profitable to one man or one group might be harmful to another man or another group. By seeking what was profitable, one came into conflict with others. Therefore, Mencius advocated that the individual man and the state should seek what is just, proper, and right (i) and not what is profitable. (li) (p. 125)
In politics, this distinguished two kinds of state and leadership. The benevolent government which adhered to the moral principles and the oppressive ones which use force in profit-seeking (p. 196). Since the moral principle united men and states, a benevolent state would rise to be the greatest (136, 171, 183, 201, 273). Although extremely idealistic, Mencius was quite practical in his political doctrines. He had the highest regard for the people, declaring:
"The people are the most important and honorable [in a nation]; the spirit of the state is the next; the ruler is the lightest. Therefore, to gain [the hearts of] the peasantry is the way to become sovereign" (483). And "Those who lost the hearts of the people lost the realm" And: "Heaven sees as the people see; Heaven hears as the people hear." (p. 357) But he had no illusion that every individual can be made self-sufficient and equal to every one else in the state. In his criticism of Hsu Hsing's advocation that every one must labor to produce what his needs, Mencius pointed out that although Hsu Hsing himself tilled the land and produced his own food he did not weave his clothes, nor did he produce the iron plow but got these from exchange. According to Mencius, the state is an organization which requires division of labor. "Some labor with their minds, and some labor with their strength. Those who labor with their minds regulate others; those who labor with their strength are regulated by others." (246-250) (296).
Those in higher positions had a greater influence and responsibility. (p. 238). What is needed is to make the position according to ability. (165-166, 199) In this matter, the opinion of the people is most important. A ruler should not believe in something when all those about him and even all great officers praise or criticize a certain person: but when all the people praise or criticize such a person, he should examine the case and act. The ones in official position not only serve but also constrain the ruler. "If the ruler have great faults, they ought to remonstrate with him, and if he does not listen to them after they have done so again and again, they ought to dethrone him." (p. 392) In the extreme case, it is righteous to kill an evil ruler. For one who outrages human nature (jen) is called a robber and one who outrages righteousness is called a ruffian; if a ruler does these things he is no longer a ruler. (p. 167) Also, love or hatred is a mutual reaction.
"When a ruler regards his ministers and subjects as his hands and feet, they regard him as their belly and heart; when he regards them as his dogs and horses, they regard him as merely any other man; when he regards them as dirts and grass, they regard him as a robber and an enemy." (p. 318)
"When a ruler rejoices in the joy of his people, they also rejoice in his joy; when he grieves at the sorrow of his people, they also grieve at his sorrow. A sympathy of joy will pervade the realm; a sympathy of sorrow will do the same." (158) This is the ideal of the politics of commiseration.
Mencius did not ignore the external factors and the profit motivation but suggested some practical policies to deal with these. Confucius had said that the most important tasks of the government was first to enrich the people and then to teach them. Mencius greatly elaborated this point. A benevolent government "should be sparing in the use of punishments and fines and should make the taxes and levies light," so that the people may produce the abundance of material wealth and improve their lives. The war of aggression is bad because it interrupts the people's productive pursuits. (135-136). Trade is good for the exchange of goods rather than for profit; it should be encouraged and regulated, rather than taxed, by the government (199-200, 278). "In good years, the children of the people are most of them good, while in bad years the most of them abandon themselves to evil." This is owing to the external conditions; the seeds of barley are the same but those sown in the good soil grow well while those in the bad soil do not grow well. (404).
Finally, Mencius saw profit-seeking arising not from necessity but from scarcity.
"The people cannot live without water and fire; yet if you knock at a man's door in the evening and ask for water and fire, there is no man who will not give them [free], such is the abundance of those things. If a sage governs the kingdom so as to make other goods as abundant as water and fire, [There will be no evil profit-seeking], and how shall the people be other than good?" (462-463).
For almost one hundred years, the teaching of Confucius suffered distortion by both his followers and his critics. They interpreted the vague and unsystematic words of Confucius to suit their different purposes. It was Mencius who first offered some important clarification and constructive interpretation of the Confucian doctrine. Meanwhile, things had greatly changed. The new class position of the scholars and thinkers became more honorable and there were more rival scholars and thinkers competing for high honors. Travelling from state to state, Mencius was surrounded by a large group of disciples, he was treated with high honor by the rulers of the various states, but he also had to argue more forcefully with his opponents.
By that time, the extremist doctrines of the Mohist and the Ultra-individualist probably attracted more attention than the common sense teaching of Confucius. By Mencius own words,
"The words of Yang Chu and Mo Ti fill the country. In people's conversations, if they do not follow teaching, then they follow Mo's." (Legge, II, 282) According to Mencius, if one cares only for himself, he has no sense of the superior (the political order); if one loves every one else like he loves his father, he has no peculiar feeling for his father (kin relations); but every common person has some sense of a superior and some peculiar feeling for his father. The extremist teachings of Yang Chu and Mo Ti were therefore inhuman. Only the birds and beasts have no concept of a superior or a father, Yang Chu and Mo Ti try to make people like the birds and the beasts. (282) This is highly rhetorical, but it came from Mencius' well-reasoned position. Mencius correctly pointed out the middle position of Confucius' idea of common sense men between the two extremes (464-465).
Confucius had emphasized the importance of men, but had not defined human nature; nor had he defined the ideal society and state. He had the confidence in men who would find the ideal society and state. This confidence was eroded by the continued disorder and suffering after Confucius died. The idea occurred that there might be something wrong in the very nature of men. Mo Ti pointed out a basic contradiction in men's potential or inclination, i.e. men's capacity to love or to harm others. Within the Confucian circle, there was the opinion that human nature is neither good nor bad, but it is morally indeterminate.
One argument was that human nature is like a willow tree and human nature is like the products of wood; to call human nature morally good is to confuse the tree with the wooden products. Against this, Mencius argued that you cannot make the wooden products contrary to their qualities, just as you cannot make moral goodness contrary to human nature; if human nature is amoral, you cannot make it moral. Another argument was: human nature is like flowing water; you open up a passage for it to flow to the east and it will flow to the east; human nature is not inclined to be good or bad, just as water is not inclined toward the east or the west. Against this, Mencius argued that water is inclined to flow downward; although by some external force you can make flow upward, but this is against the nature of water; similarly, human nature is inclined to be good; even though there are some external influences which make men do evil things, this is against man's innate nature.
But what is man's innate nature? It is commonly agreed that this is what is born in man. One argument was: What is born in man is the physical life, the amoral biological instincts. Against this, Mencius raised the basic question concerning the "universal" verses the " particular". He asked; Is there a unique and universal "whiteness" in what is called "white"? In other words, is the "whiteness" in the white feather the same as the "whiteness" in the white snow or in the white jade? If it is, then the nature of a dog is the same as the nature of a cow and the same as the nature of man. If it is not, then the nature of man is not just the universal biological life but something particular in the human being. (pp. 394-397).
Mencius saw morality as what is particular in man, and what makes human beings beings different from mere animals. But how can it be certain that morality is innate in man just as the animal instincts are innate in the animals, and is not something external or artificial, such as an accidental product of society or the environment? Here Mencius made his observation on the "non-societal and non-environmental" human psychology.
"When I say that all men have a mind which cannot bear to see the sufferings of others, my meaning may be illustrated thus: now, if men suddenly see a child about to fall into a well, they will without exception experience a feeling of alarm and distress. They feel so, not as a ground on which they may gain the favor of the child's parents, nor as a ground on which they may seek the praise of their neighbors and friends, nor from a dislike of the reputation for having been unmoved by such a thing. ( All such considerations may come later to the cunning mind, but they come later. What came in the unreflective suddenness was just a feeling of alarm and distress, uncomplicated by artificiality).
From this, Mencius opined that "the feeling of commiseration", "the feeling of shame and dislike", "the feeling of modesty and complaisance" and "the feeling of approving and disapproving" are essential to all men, all common moral human beings. (pp.202-203).
Great morality is built upon these simple common feelings of the ordinary human being, because:
" The feeling of commiseration is the beginning of benevolence. The feeling of shame and dislike is the beginning of righteousness and justice. The feeling of modesty and complaisance is the the beginning of propriety. And the feeling of approving and disapproving is the beginning of knowledge and wisdom". (p.203 & 402).
What is needed is to expand these innate feelings in the ordinary man. For instance, a ruler, being an ordinary man, having a feeling of commiseration will practice commiserating politics. Once Mencius urged King Hsüan of Ch'i to be a commiserating ruler. The heart of King Hsüan had been moved by the suffering of an ox about to be butchered. And Mencius said: "If you could not bear to see the suffering of an ox, how can you bear to see the suffering of your people; if you really reflect on this, you will become a benevolent king".
Mencius postulated a moral essence permeating the cosmos (hao-jan Chih-ch'i) (p.189-190) Every human being was endowed with a moral nature by the cosmos. By expanding one's moral nature, one came into contact with the cosmic essence. It enabled man to unite with other men and finally to be in union with the cosmic Heaven. Heaven endowed in man the original moral feelings. "By fully expanding such moral feelings, one knows his nature; knowing his nature, one knows Heaven. By preserving such moral feelings and nourishing one's nature, man is serving Heaven". (pp.448-449).
Of course Mencius did not take the matter so simply. He knew that men can do many evils. Good and evil constituted a contradiction which gave man a choice (p. 411). Man must continuously make difficult decisions between these two throughout life, and moral greatness is the result of great struggle and suffering:
"Thus, when Heaven is about to confer a great responsibility to a man, it first exercises his mind with suffering, and exerts his sinews and bones with toil. It exposes his body to hunger and subjects him to extreme deprivation. It confounds his deprivations. By all these, it stimulates his mind, hardens his nature, and supplies his incompetences.
"Men for the most part err, and are afterward able to reform. They are distressed in mind and perplexed in their thought, and then they arise to vigorous reformation."
The same difficult struggle also existed for the great nations:
"If a state had no harsh regulations nor strong-willed remonstrators inside and no strong state nor foreign threats outside, it perished. From these, we see how life springs from sorrow and calamity, and death from ease and pleasure." (p.447)
The conflict between men's moral nature and outside influences entails the conflict in the value-judgement of what is right (just, proper), and what is profitable (beneficial, utilitarian). In the very first chapter of the work of Mencius, there is a rigorous denunciation of the profit motivation. According to Mencius, confused knowledge what is right with what is profitable. What is just, proper and right (i) may be universalized and made common agreement among different individuals and groups, thus uniting them in the moral universe. The external conditions, however, differed. What is profitable to one man or one group might be harmful to another man or another group. By seeking what was profitable, one came into conflict with others. Therefore, Mencius advocated that the individual man and the state should seek what is just, proper, and right (i) and not what is profitable. (li) (p. 125)
In politics, this distinguished two kinds of state and leadership. The benevolent government which adhered to the moral principles and the oppressive ones which use force in profit-seeking (p. 196). Since the moral principle united men and states, a benevolent state would rise to be the greatest (136, 171, 183, 201, 273). Although extremely idealistic, Mencius was quite practical in his political doctrines. He had the highest regard for the people, declaring:
"The people are the most important and honorable [in a nation]; the spirit of the state is the next; the ruler is the lightest. Therefore, to gain [the hearts of] the peasantry is the way to become sovereign" (483). And "Those who lost the hearts of the people lost the realm" And: "Heaven sees as the people see; Heaven hears as the people hear." (p. 357) But he had no illusion that every individual can be made self-sufficient and equal to every one else in the state. In his criticism of Hsu Hsing's advocation that every one must labor to produce what his needs, Mencius pointed out that although Hsu Hsing himself tilled the land and produced his own food he did not weave his clothes, nor did he produce the iron plow but got these from exchange. According to Mencius, the state is an organization which requires division of labor. "Some labor with their minds, and some labor with their strength. Those who labor with their minds regulate others; those who labor with their strength are regulated by others." (246-250) (296).
Those in higher positions had a greater influence and responsibility. (p. 238). What is needed is to make the position according to ability. (165-166, 199) In this matter, the opinion of the people is most important. A ruler should not believe in something when all those about him and even all great officers praise or criticize a certain person: but when all the people praise or criticize such a person, he should examine the case and act. The ones in official position not only serve but also constrain the ruler. "If the ruler have great faults, they ought to remonstrate with him, and if he does not listen to them after they have done so again and again, they ought to dethrone him." (p. 392) In the extreme case, it is righteous to kill an evil ruler. For one who outrages human nature (jen) is called a robber and one who outrages righteousness is called a ruffian; if a ruler does these things he is no longer a ruler. (p. 167) Also, love or hatred is a mutual reaction.
"When a ruler regards his ministers and subjects as his hands and feet, they regard him as their belly and heart; when he regards them as his dogs and horses, they regard him as merely any other man; when he regards them as dirts and grass, they regard him as a robber and an enemy." (p. 318)
"When a ruler rejoices in the joy of his people, they also rejoice in his joy; when he grieves at the sorrow of his people, they also grieve at his sorrow. A sympathy of joy will pervade the realm; a sympathy of sorrow will do the same." (158) This is the ideal of the politics of commiseration.
Mencius did not ignore the external factors and the profit motivation but suggested some practical policies to deal with these. Confucius had said that the most important tasks of the government was first to enrich the people and then to teach them. Mencius greatly elaborated this point. A benevolent government "should be sparing in the use of punishments and fines and should make the taxes and levies light," so that the people may produce the abundance of material wealth and improve their lives. The war of aggression is bad because it interrupts the people's productive pursuits. (135-136). Trade is good for the exchange of goods rather than for profit; it should be encouraged and regulated, rather than taxed, by the government (199-200, 278). "In good years, the children of the people are most of them good, while in bad years the most of them abandon themselves to evil." This is owing to the external conditions; the seeds of barley are the same but those sown in the good soil grow well while those in the bad soil do not grow well. (404).
Finally, Mencius saw profit-seeking arising not from necessity but from scarcity.
"The people cannot live without water and fire; yet if you knock at a man's door in the evening and ask for water and fire, there is no man who will not give them [free], such is the abundance of those things. If a sage governs the kingdom so as to make other goods as abundant as water and fire, [There will be no evil profit-seeking], and how shall the people be other than good?" (462-463).
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